Section 301: the section so numbered of the United States Trade Act of 1974. It was amended in 1979 (Trade Agreements Act), 1984 (Trade and Tariff Act), 1988 (Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act) and 1994 (Uruguay Round Agreements Act). Section 301 is designed to enforce United States rights under trade agreements and to provide for responses to foreign unfair trading practices following petition and investigation. Unfair trading practices may take place in the United States, in the offending country itself or in third countries. Section 301 may also be used to obtain increased market access for United States goods and services, to secure fairer conditions for its investors abroad and to promote more effective protection in other countries for United States intellectual property rights. It also allows USTR to limit imports from countries that unfairly restrict United States trade in particular products. It is generally used for single product sectors. Section 301 had its origin in Section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which gave the President broad authority to retaliate against unjustifiable agricultural barriers, and lesser authority to deal with other trade barriers. Section 252 was only used twice, once during the Chicken War which marked the beginning of the Kennedy Round. When it became Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, it eliminated the distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural products, and it also covered services associated with international trade. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 set out that the President should use his authority to enforce trade agreements. Under the earlier versions of Section 301, USTR could initiate investigations and recommend appropriate action to the President. The passing of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 transferred authority to retaliate from the President to USTR, subject to any presidential direction. Retaliation now became mandatory in principle, but considerable scope for discretion remained. The threat of a Section 301 action is most unwelcome to trade policy makers, not only because it may mean rethinking the rules in the targeted areas, but also because the defence requires much effort that is otherwise unproductive. Taking action is equally resource-intensive for the Americans, and USTR tends to pick cases it perceives as winnable to the extent that it has the choice. That flexibility has