Essay of Public Choice
By Alex Añazco*

Free Market or Protectionism: A Review of Issues

Abstract

Government intervention is visible in all economies. A pure free market does not exist. I will refer in this paper to the subsidies which the industrialized countries give to their producers and the effects and discriminations on the less developed countries, since it is very known that developing countries depend on agricultural products. In addition, the high government intervention in developing countries is visible. The actual problems in the poor countries are corruption and emigration, which could be therefore either an effect or a consequence. I will develop this essay with the use and guidance of the book “Public Choice III” by Dennis Mueller. I will focus more on one country, Ecuador, as a developing country, and the Europe Union as a strong developed group where industrialized countries are located. Other issues are involved in the economy that it will be mentioned as well. Opening the market and a minimal intervention of the government will help to create a better environment for the economy.

1. Introduction

Man is by nature a political animal.

Aristotle

The proposal of any new law or regulation which comes from [businessmen], ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.

Adam Smith

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* Postgraduate student of University of Economics in Prague, Faculty of Economics and Public Administration, Department of Economic Policy,

In this paper, I will empirically examine the problems of the free market and protectionism. Not only because it is the actual problem, but also because it has consequences the form of more government interventions and more disequilibrium in the democracy. I believe in an open economy as you can find positive effects such as economic growth in several examples throughout the world (Ampuero 2005:3).

In both Ecuador and the European Union (EU) you will find interventionism, but where this governmental influence is concentrated differs in the two entities. In Ecuador, there is interventionism in nearly all key sectors, but in the EU the interventionism in found mostly in the agricultural sector. This kind of intervention and protectionism creates distortions in the economy where the consumers have to pay more money for products and services, when they could increase and develop the economy if there was less interventionism.

I will revise basic concepts and explain with a real life simple example, where it is obvious that with less interventionism, the economy will succeed. However, at the same time, it is not simply that easy. More issues make the economy more complex, as James M. Buchanan, the father of the Public Choice, stated. Is the existence of the state necessary, and is it working well? What about democracies? The influence of the interest groups, lobbying and campaign contributions (Mueller 2003:472) is a review which I am going to make with the support of the book by Dennis Mueller.

Later I will complete the paper with others factors which are indispensable to take into account, as the economy is correlated with everything. In brief, in this paper I will relate all of the factors that are correlated, such as bribes, corruption, migration, poverty, populism, etc., which will be developed before the conclusion.

With all the concepts reviewed, I empirically will reach a conclusion, where I believe that it is indispensable to open the market. Meanwhile in developed countries the agriculture is protected with subsidies, and populist politicians are taking advantage of these arguments and making the environment of the economy and the democracy much worse, especially in Ecuador and in the Andean region in Latin America. In the end, I think that it is necessary to make more studies regarding this matter with a wide and complete research.

 

2. Conceptual framework

I will briefly develop James M. Buchanan’s interpretation of the history, development and content of the field of public choice. Public choice it is not a method in the usual sense of the term; which means it is neither a group of tools nor a particular application of the standard tools with standard methods, although we are lightly reaching the last description. Public choice is a perspective about the policy that emerges from an extension and application of the tools and methods of the economist based on the public and collective decisions.

In addition, Buchanan interprets the matter in two aspects, which the first is the catallaxy (the economy as the science of the exchange) and the most familiar postulate of the homo economicus about the individual behavior1. What do the economists have to do? This was a question where the answer was to anoint an exorcism of the paradigm of the maximization that occupied our box of tools; give up or stop to define our discipline, our science, in terms of limits of the scarcity. We have to change the definition, to include the own name of the science; and stop worrying about the assignations of resources and the efficiency. We have to concentrate on the origins, the properties and the exchange institutions, considerate in wide terms.

The propensity that Adam Smith felt toward the barter and the exchange of one thing to another is the most classical. Even Professor Hayek suggests that the term catallaxy, which, according to him, it is more close to the Greek origins of the word. Hayek derived the word catallaxy from the Greek verb “katallassein” or “katallattein”, which meant not only “to exchange” but also “to admit in the community” and “to change from enemy to friend” (Hayek 1976:108-9).

Continuing with the theoretical matter, the perspective to public choice by Austrian contributions is important and very interesting (Hayek 1948). Hayek was worried about how socialism changes the demands on democratic systems and how with this process socialism transforms the democratic institutions into institutions of tyranny, and this effect of socialism is evident in the growth of the interest groups.
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1. See La perspectiva de la elección pública by James M. Buchanan in Ensayos sobre Economía Política. Available in: http://www.eumed.net/cursecon/textos/buchanan-elecc-publica.htm
Consequently, as socialism’s popularity grew, the number of special interests pleading for privileges ballooned (Hayek 1945:40). Like public choice theorists, Hayek understood the danger of interest groups in the context of the logic of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs. “Innumerable interests… could show that particular measures would confer immediate and obvious benefits on some, the harm they caused (on others) was much more indirect and difficult to see” (Hayek 1945:17)

Equilibrium most likely exists where the individuals have to resolve a choice of something. The social phenomena are centered around a group of individuals who are faced with a choice of doing what is best for the group or what is best for themselves. “Probably the most important accomplishment of economics is the demonstration that individuals with purely selfish motives can mutually benefit from exchange” (Mueller 2003:9). Here we arrive at instances of the phenomena that are called different names, and the most recognized is the well known “Prisoner’s Dilemma”.

There is also another classic article, The Coase Theorem (Coase 1960), arguing the traditional wisdom in economics referring to taxes, subsidies and externalities. Coase challenged that the existence of an external effect associated with a given activity did not inevitably require governmental intervention in the form of taxes and subsidies. “Pareto-optimal resolutions of externality situations could be and often were worked out between the affected parties without the help of the government” (Mueller 2003:27).

Public Choice theory is directed toward the study of politics based on economic principles. One of the most important contributions of the Public Choice theory is that it recognizes that politicians are motivated by self-interests, the same like a common person or individual. That is the reason then, that citizen’s expectations of politicians changes dramatically. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock are recognized as being the developers of Public Choice Theory, and their book (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) is considered a classic on this matter. Therefore, I am going to quote a question and an answer of one interview2 with Buchanan that could help later in the essay:

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2. Interview with James Buchanan, The Region (1995), Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, September. Available in http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/95-09/int959.cfm
“(Question): It appears at first glance that many Public Choice economists are politically conservative and free-market oriented. Would that be an accurate description of those academics in the Public Choice movement?
(Buchanan’s answer): I think it's an accurate description—but it's an accurate description for a reason. If you take the story I've given you, if you recognize that the traditional way we looked at politics had a lot of romance in it, then Public Choice comes along and removes the romance. I think the natural outcome of that is you're going to be more skeptical about government than you would have been otherwise.
Mancur Olson, a good friend of mine, has been influential in Public Choice and objects very strongly to this argument that there is this conservative bias. There is no bias in it as such. But Mancur himself has necessarily had to look at politics differently because of that, despite the fact that his natural proclivity would be more left than mine. There's nothing inherently biased about it. It's just that the fact that if you start looking at the political sector or politics from a non-romantic view, you come to a different view on what has been traditional.
Economists traditionally have been much more pro-market and anti- politics, anti-government than the other parts of the Academy in general. But throughout the decades economists have been frustrated by the fact that they put their ideas out there and nobody pays any attention. Economists have found you can't go out there and sell the idea of a market economy very readily. You have to be sophisticated to understand it. It's difficult to sell the idea of a market economy, so economists haven't been very effective. Potentially, Public Choice, it seems to me, has been effective in a different way altogether. Public Choice does not say that the market is perfect or the market works at all. That's not part of it. But it says that politics fails. There are a lot of people out there who will recognize that politics fails and, therefore, will be in support of a market, who would never have come around to support the market in terms of the pro side. They'll see the anti-politics side, so that's how Public Choice comes in”.

With these, I would like to arrive to another one, which we are lightly going to reach to the sample of this essay. Reviewing a chapter of the book by Mueller, about the interest groups, campaign contributions, and lobbying (Mueller 2003:472-5) he quoted the hypotheses about interest groups as one of the classics of the public choice literature (Olson:1965). Interest groups come in a wide variety of institutional forms and sizes. Often a group is organized to pursue one objective, and then once organized, turns to other forms of activity of benefit to its members. Labor unions came into being to improve the bargaining power of workers vis-à-vis management.
Based on this, a counterintuitive prediction of Olson’s theory is that small interest groups are much more effective at obtaining favors from the government than larger groups are. This is a very dramatic and actual point of this essay that supports the hypothesis of the agricultural policies of nations around the world as explained as follows. In less developed countries, the agricultural sector is large and the group of middle-class urban dwellers is small, and farmers receive small or even negative subsidies for their products, that is, the government often sees that the farmers receive less than world market prices. In the richer nations, farmers in the developed countries make up just a tiny fraction of the workforce, yet they often receive giant subsidies.
In the table 1, we can appreciate the distortions in the prices of food in different countries. While the food prices are positive in most industrial, developed countries, they are actually negative in most developing countries. The levels of protection in this sample, is measured in nominal terms, as Nominal Protection Rate indirect (NPRi), Nominal Protection Rate direct (NPRd) and in Nominal Protection Rate total (NPRt). Direct protection rates vary between 85.9 percent in Switzerland and -26.9 percent in Ghana. Van Bastelaer (1998) developed the Olson hypothesis in a paper and in his paper, he suggests and tests it: “the price of food items is determined by political agendas at the national level, rather than by climatic conditions or variations in global food markets, and the content of these political agendas is the direct result of the conflictual interaction of producer and consumer lobbies” (Van Bastelaer 1998:44).

In the same paper, Van Bastelear suggests a new research supported by one paradox: “although agricultural producers in industrialized countries represent a small proportion of the labor force, their political influence is such that they receive prices for their products which, on average, lie well above international prices. Farmers in developing countries, on the other hand, constitute the majority of the labor force, yet they rarely have the upper hand in the struggle for the influence over the public policies that affect their returns. As a result, they face agricultural prices that are low, relative to the international standards”. Here it is easy to see that the small interest groups are more influential than big interest groups in the design of food policies, and also Van Bastelear made an extra analysis: “as food consumers become richer, they are more willing to implicitly subsidize local farmers”. (The example of the automobile industry is a good one (Mueller 2003:474) to see when the weak or the smaller group “exploit” the strong or the biggest group).

Table 1. Nominal rates of agricultural protection, sample countries, sorted by protection level percent.


This assumption was not new, as it was developed by Olson, as I wrote above, in his classic book (Olson 1965:36). Olson’s book states, “The larger a group is, the farther it will fall short of obtaining an optimal supply of any collective good, and the less likely that it will act to obtain even a minimal amount of such good. In short, the larger the group, the less it will further its common interest”.

Reaching to the aim of the easy I will continue with the hypothesis of Van Bastelear (1998:48). Suppose the farm lobby (could be in a small country in the EU for our paper for example) and the urban coalition is competing for price protection by the government. We assume that there are a million members in the farm lobby and three million in the urban coalition. We suppose that the total population is not fixed and a large number of immigrants (they could be from Latin America (Ecuador) that serve us as example in this paper), let’s say an average of a million people, joins to urban coalition. “The political influence of the farmers (and therefore the level of protection they receive) is likely to increase as a result of the migration”. Inclusive we can assume that the size of the farm group is not fixed, because the urban coalition will include more members, so there is still a million farmers after the immigration, but the share of them in the global population has fallen from 25 to 20 percent. As we see in this paper and as quoted above, the smaller the agricultural sector is, the higher price protection it receives in comparison to the larger agricultural one.

I will not develop this hypothesis, but we have to be conscious of how the public choice works and how public finance is in the real world. A public good can satisfy one group, but on the other hand it could be harmful to the society. That happens when the government intervenes in the economy. As Olson said: “This is equally true when the public-good concept is applied only to governments; for a military expenditure, or a tariff, or an immigrant restriction that is a public good to one country could be a “public bas” to another country, and harmful to world society as a whole” (Olson 1965:15).

The public choice, as I see it, is very complex and has many consequences and came from the men who can manipulate if given the possibility to do so. This is why the democracy in some countries are so vulnerable because the state depends on the legislation, and several times depends on what these powerful groups decide, and does not depend if it is big or small, but rather it depends on how they can take advantage of them.
The ignorance of the majority in the society on the matter of how public choice really works creates confusions and in many times, creates frustration.

Meanwhile the rich countries talk about opening the market which they still protect, especially the agricultural sector. Moreover, as I described above, it does not depend on the governors but rather, it depends on the lobby that is around the government. This kind of protectionism creates a special environment on the affected countries. It is well known, that in developing countries, the farmers constitute the majority of the labor force, and in the developed countries, farmers constitute a minority of the labor force. Therefore, in spite of the policies of protectionism and policies of immigration in the rich countries, people from the developing countries try to emigrate (in these unfair conditions the laborers can not compete and do not have any choice).

Moreover, politicians in developing countries take advantage of this and create this environment of protectionism too, as a kind of reprisal, but it leads to even worst reality reaching the extreme and very unusual populism and anti-imperialism in the less developing countries. This kind of populism is very dangerous because it is manipulated very well with a sentimental rhetoric by this populist group, which I will refer to later before my conclusion in brief.

3. Empiric

In this chapter I will refer to one product that is representative in the economy of Ecuador. This product, the banana, is in high demand throughout the world, and the EU is a very important market for this product. The market of bananas between Ecuador and the EU is important as I said because of the importance in the Ecuadorian economy. The consequences of this protectionism against the free-market system will be analyzed, even with the characteristic of the relations with the competitors of other countries and perspectives of the increment of consumers.

As states Adam Smith in The Wealth of the Nations, in all the countries, the interest of the majority is and must be to buy always that which is needed from those who sell it cheaper.
According to a recent report of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the protectionism and subsidies in the developed countries cost to the developing countries around US$ 24 billion dollar yearly in agro industrial losses and incomes. According to the same report, Latin America and the Caribbean loose nearly US$ 8.3 billion dollars in agricultural income yearly. The report quoted that the EU is the biggest guilty party of the distortion of the agricultural export market of the developing countries.

The EU maintains a Subsidies Regimen with a zero customs tariff on the bananas produced in nations related with the same EU, ex-colonies, Africa and the Caribbean, but on the other hand the EU maintains a quota regimen with custom tariffs to the Latin American banana producers.

There are different positions and opinions about the license, custom tariffs and duties in the banana market of the EU, therefore over protectionism related with the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United State. This is the reason that is indispensable to promote a policy of free-market without any restrictive barriers to free competition and with transparent rules (Ampuero 2004).

The industry of bananas in Ecuador represents 6 percent in the composition of the GDP, and in this percentage, the banana industry contributed with 24 percent, representing the most important sector after the oil industry in generating foreign currency. The banana is an important factor in labor force in the country. Approximately 1,100.000 people work directly and indirectly in the banana industry, which represents 28 percent of the population. Approximately 150,000 hectares are dedicated to the banana production for the exportation.

The following graphic shows us that the majority of Ecuadorian bananas are exported to the EU at 41%, followed by the United States and Eastern Europe, each at 22%.

With the perspectives of the increment of the ten new members into the Europe Union, consumption of the fruit will increase in the same proportion. That is why on April 16 of 2004, the EU announced the opening of an additional quota of 300,000 tons of bananas. This new quote will be distributed over a new actual agreement (Ampuero 2004:22).

 

GRAPHIC
EXPORT OF BANANA BY DESTINY (2003)

Source: Banana Exporter Association of Ecuador (AEBE)
Elaborated: The Ecuadorian Institute for Political Economy (IEEP)

 

The Ecuadorian banana industry as it is known, has an important influence on the economy of the country and creates work both directly and indirectly. The structure of the industry is modern and has a high quality with low prices when compared to the other competitors. This is why the government has to promote a policy with an open market to free competition, without any barriers. At least the industrial countries are confident on this matter, and they gave a date to cut and reduce all the subsidies and barriers.

But in the reality, it does not work as easily as stated in the interest commentaries of “The Doha Joke,” by Vargas Llosa, which defines in simple words the cruel reality. The last World Trade Organization meeting decided to cut subsidies and agricultural and industrial tariffs in April of this year. The deadline has passed and the Doha Round of the global trade is not making any progress. Not even a small amount of progress has been made by bilateral agreements.

As I wrote above, according to the analysis of Olson, the reality is still the same, when we can see how bureaucrats make difficult for everybody to understand how simple the market and the economy have to work. Less developed countries want to sell more agricultural products to industrial countries that normally protect their farmers; and developed countries want to export more services and manufactures to developing countries that normally obstruct their access.

During negotiation, developed countries offered to eliminate 97 percent of their tariffs, but the remaining 3% of the tariffs not eliminated affects the biggest portion of their markets. On the other hand, the developing countries make an offer to open the market to foreign capital under clearer guidelines, but insisting on retaining subtle restrictions that will amount to maintaining the current situation. The Europe Union does not have a consensus on international trade. The farm lobby in France is very strong and does not agree with the rest of the EU’s position on eliminating barriers.

Also, differences exist between the Europe Union and the United State around the negotiations for eliminating the barriers. The EU offered to reduce the farm subsidies by 47 percent; meanwhile the U.S. pressed the EU to reduce the farm subsidies by 75 percent. In the same way, the EU accuses the Americans of not reducing their own agricultural subsidies, when the U.S. reminded the Europeans that the EU agricultural subsidies are the double the amount of the American subsidies.

In the end, I want to quote an interesting commentary about the world market in very simple terms, as stated by Vargas Llosa3: “In a rational world, every country would simply eliminate its trade barriers and subsidies unilaterally. In the real world, we tend to complicate matters so much that we eventually need to create a labyrinth like the Doha Round global trade talks in which we keep going around in circles without finding a way out. All we need to do is stop treating trade negotiations as if they were part of a war settlement in which each country seeks to aggrandize its territory at the expense of everybody else. In matters of trade, things work in exactly the opposite way: the more territory you concede—that is, the less protection you maintain—the bigger the size of your country’s power”.

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3. Vargas Llosa, Alvaro (2006). The Doha Joke, The Independent Institute, May 4. Available in: http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1715
4. Other factors to take into account: endogenous and exogenous

“It cannot be denied that dictatorship, interventionism, and socialism are extremely popular today. No argument of logic can weaken this popularity” (Mises 1998:85). Rational thinking is weak against emotions and passion, and in politics this makes a very dangerous combination. To better understand this reasoning, I will continue with the sample of Ecuador where the people that manage the national companies manipulate the public good. Before passing to the reality of the political economy and democracy in Ecuador I will first mention an analysis made by Caplan and Stringham (2004:3) about Bastiat’s and Mises’s position regarding the public choice in democracy.

Bastiat and Mises were optimistic in order to translate the opinion of the public into the policy. Meanwhile their acknowledgement about the existence of lateness and other frictions, they considered that as an exception to the rules. On other hand, traditional public choice see problems in the democracy, when the special interests of politicians, bureaucrats, businesspersons, etc; highjack the democracy.

Bastiat and Mises, in other hand, are pessimistic about the opinion of the public. In contemporary terms, “they believe that the general public suffers from systematically biased beliefs about economics”. The masses of people believe that protectionism would help the level of life, where low salaries do not generate unemployment and the consumers with minimal options to choose goods and services increase their quality of life.

I will not be going deeper into this matter, but there is an excellent analysis (Caplan 2004) of an expert on this matter that can help to understand better how the public choice in the public opinion really works, when it is manipulated by the circumstances. I will just quote the problems that derivate on this in the reality.

Because of all of this, populism in the policy has existed for a long time. Populist leaders have seen themselves as the embodiment of the democratic ideal. “They conceive of democracy as mass mobilization and the occupation of public space rather than as respect for procedures and the rule of law” (de la Torre 1997:12).
With this rhetoric the democracy can manipulate and then just follow the statistic of what the people want and they do not care if it is the correct way or not. The politicians just want to be in power and they are there to serve the lobby that puts them in the power. This is obvious and makes sense, but the mass do not understand it very well.

I have to analyze more in detail this phenomenon. In Latin America three mediations between the civil society and the state exist: citizenship, the nation, and lo popular. And “(…) as in other Latin America countries, citizenship in Ecuador has tended to be restricted and to give priority to political and social over civil rights; hence the nation and lo popular have become the links between state and civil society” (de la Torre 1997:14).

The populist politicians with the emotional rhetoric construct their rivals as enemies who have to be destroyed. Since they incarnate virtue and moral redemption, their enemies represent sin and misery (de la Torre 1997:16). The aim of populist is to discredit rival politicians in the political arena and construct them as enemies.

The corruption in the national entities is obvious to the mass, but it seems that no body cares. Even in recent days in South America, nationalism seems to be coming back. Just in the case of Ecuador, the rank of the activities of the state is very wide. Not only does it have the legal prerogative on the oil resources, telecommunications, power plants, but also provides potable water, education, health, social security, house, road infrastructure, financial services and bank loans, harbor and airport services (with own airlines). Additionally, the state is the regulator of the agricultural sector, banking, industrial, aerial traffic, business in general and of the activities. The stat makes itself an exclusive form. Moreover, until a few years ago the state maintained the monopoly of money emission, the control of the money exchange, and even controlled the post and mail sectors. Also the state provides the services of internal security with the police, control of transit, outer defense with the Armed Forces, and the administration of justice. Briefly, the Ecuadorian government is a producer (monopolistic) of goods and services, promoter of the economy, protector of the individual rights (at least nominal), controller of itself and poor benefactor of pensioners, unmarried mothers and handicaps.
But all of this amalgam of functions and activities that the Ecuadorian government performs on a diffusing and opaque way, which generates costs in the economic process, has not been quantified in its totality, and in some cases, is not susceptible of quantification in monetary terms (Romero 2003:7-8).
Table 2


Table 2 (Cont.)

The size of the government is even larger than previously mentioned. Even in the classification of the activities of the state we have to account the financial sector as the National Financial Corporation (Corporación Financiera Nacional –CFN), Pacific Bank (Banco del Pacífico), Central Bank of Ecuador (Banco Central del Ecuador –BCE), National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Fomento –BNF), etc. and other additional activities which the government manages and controls, but they are not in any accountancy in any budget open to the public opinion.

The economic activities in Ecuador are highly related directly and indirectly with the state. The economic stability needs fiscal reforms and to reduce the high dependence on oil revenues. Since Ecuador loss it’s monetary policy when it adopted the dollarization4, the fiscal policy is now the only tool that can support the economy. Also it is indispensable to strengthen the public finances with better administration of the tax revenues and to lower the cost of public and external debt. Meanwhile, there has to be a strengthening in the depoliticizing of the public enterprises and an encouraging of private investment and strengthening financial system supervision, in order to achieve durable improvements in financial system efficiency and reductions in interest rates5.

A liberalization of the economy and the encouragement of privatization could be ideal, but the intent that was made in the 1990’s was impossible because it was not transparent and it could be just a transfer of the state monopoly to a private monopoly (Bardhan 1997:1335). The neo-liberalism that was in apogee in the 1990’s also did not receive acceptance with the citizens, not only in Ecuador, but in all of Latin America. Many times the concepts of neo-liberalism are confused with the free market. Whenever, neo-liberalism is the continuity of socialism by other methods.

Moreover the liberalization of the economy in Ecuador started when the Republic was born. José Joaquín Olmedo was an important thinker of the free market in the beginning of the country’s establishment, and Eloy Alfaro6 was in the beginning of the twentieth century. An Ecuadorian historian very respectfully comments about liberalism of the time: “Some liberal thinkers condemned plutocracy but plutocracy maintained liberalism in the government and it gave money him for the elections. The same plutocracy was liberal” (Pareja 1956:79). Afterwards, a chain of dictatorship started, followed by a slight recess and then even populism until the beginning of democracy in 1979. In the new democracy, most of the time the legislators’ votes do not represent the preference of the population7, and this creates confusion and frustration.

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4. See Acosta (2002, 2003), Beckerman and Solimano (2002), Paredes (2002), and Romero (2003).
5. Statement by and International Monetary Found –IMF Staff Mission to Ecuador, November 18, 2005. Press Release No. 05/253. Available in http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2005/pr05253.htm
Table 3

Table 3 (Cont.)

As we see in the pages above, the size of the government8 in Ecuador is one of the problems because of the bad administration and the corruption. The market failures have to be corrected by interventions of the government. Nevertheless, the government failure is the corruption. However, corruption most of the time is considered as a form of transaction cost from using the government to rectify the failures of the market (Acemoglu and Verdier 2000). Anyway, because of the size of the government and the political problem in the legislation in Ecuador I will quote one of the basic problems, the bid. Most of the time, a legislature is not in the position to determine the choice of a bidder, because it usually came with a portion of bribe. “Thus, corruption is almost an inevitable consequence of the existence of government and the principal/agent problems that come with it. (…) The illegal nature of corruption, like that of activity in the underground economy, makes it difficult to measure” (Mueller 2003:545). In addition, there is an interesting study made in U.S that indicates that the corruption at the state level increase with the size of the state government (Goel and Nelson 1998).

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6. See Hurtado (1985).
7. See Higgs (1989).
8. See Mueller (2003:544) Government size and corruption.
Nevertheless, corruption has a different meaning in different societies (Bardhan 1997) and the word of corruption is used to mean different things in different contexts.

Public Sector Operations in Ecuador (percent of GDP)


In several cases, corruption also means the use of public office for private gains, where it is difficult to control by principal. This is why the excessive regulations that elaborate the state cause or engender corruption in different and unimaginable ways.
Also, a new meaning of “corruption” in government now exists: kleptocracy (it can be written cleptocracy as well). In this terming, it is well known that when the revenues of the state have high dependence on natural resources, such as oil revenues for example, then the government is prone to be Kleptocrat. Even the major corruption scandals in less developed countries are involved in this kind of subjects. There is also a hypothesis that with incentive payments for civil servants can help in the fight against corruption. Moreover, “(…) the public choice literature in the context of developing countries, does not help in understanding why corruption is more in some countries than in others (even with similar extent of state intervention), and why countries with similar over-all levels of corruption differ in its effect on productivity and growth” (Bardhan 1997:1341).

Opening the economy with a minimal government intervention is needed to decrease corruption. I think, anyway, that the failures of the government intervention are more dangerous than the market failures. Nevertheless, I think that a free-market does not have any chance in a developing country such as Ecuador, because of the super size of the state and the high government interventionism. Moreover, the growth of the economy is correlated with an open economy, private firms, free market and free competition. The decentralization of several activities in charge of the central government is needed as well as the privatization of the public monopoly that was mentioned in the pages above. (Ampuero D., Ampuero E., Romero and Andrade 2005). The positive correlation, that exists between liberty economy and the per capita incomes are widely significant. Countries, where major economic freedom exists such as in Hong Kong, Switzerland, United States, and Singapore, have a high economic development index due to their high incomes. This does not occur in countries where restriction in the liberty exists; where the per capita income does not surpass the USD $5,000 yearly.

Moreover, the interventionism persists in the developing countries like Ecuador. Ecuador with its high dependence on oil revenues should be a rich country, but one of the enormous gaps of the oil revenues is the subsidies. There is no sufficient infrastructure to produce gasoline and diesel in Ecuador and the country depends on the international and external producers. Most of the oil revenues go to buy combustible and the difference prices of combustible are subsidized.
In addition, international organizations that lend money to the state for many projects also exist. Even these organizations give some rules and economic policy in advance, if the state wants these international credits. Nevertheless, the politicians are in charge for a short period, and in the case of Ecuador this makes the policy vulnerable to the changing government, as Ecuador has the luxury to change presidents every year because the constitution permits it. For example, there have been 10 presidents in the last decade in Ecuador. Not only the experts know that contract or borrow great amounts of loans for the state, allow excellent returns (incomes) in commissions that are normally accepted in the international trading. The external debt or the eternal debt is other of the Aquilles heel.

Furthermore, in economics “rent-seeking” normally implies the extraction of uncompensated value from others without taking actions that improve productivity, such as by imposing regulations or other governmental decisions that harm consumers. The term “rent-seeking”9 was adapted by Gordon Tullock (1967), although the phrase was coined in 1974 by Anne Krueger in a paper written independently of Tullock’s works. Rent-seeking10 is often associated with lobbying for economic regulations such as tariffs. If an institution can calculate the cost of lobbying, bribing, or otherwise causing the government to promulgate a favorable regulation, then it can compare the cost with those that are necessary to succeed with a similar profit within the market for instance, by capital improvements or increased efficiency. If purchasing a favorable regulatory environment is cheaper than building more efficient production, then a firm’s real income may be entirely uncompensated. This would result in a sub-optimal allocation of resources, meaning, money would be spent on lobbyists instead of investing in improved business practices, and this retards the productivity growth.

Moreover, the positive and negative externalities and free-riders will be internalized or not in the market process according the taste, pleasure and the preferences of the moment and, in its case, according to the costs involved, but in any case could be considered as a market failure.

__________________________
9. See Mueller (2003:333)
10. See also Calderón and Chong (2006)
Nevertheless, governmental interventionism constitutes a failure, or a tragedy10, when it makes use of the force to internalize and distort the relative prices preventing and disabling the efficient allocation of resources. In the end, public goods, externalities and free-riders do not explain and support the interventionism of monopoly force.

5. Conclusion

The Political Economy ought not to have in account the morality. However, anyone that praise a concrete measure, ought been to have in account not only the economic consequences, but also the morality consequences, religions, politics, etc.
Wilfred Pareto

The governmental interventionism has a lot of influence in the economy. Any kind of subsidy creates a distortion in the real prices. The market failure supposedly is to be corrected by government interventionism, but we have to be sure who is going to protect the rules and legislation. Democracy has to be maintained, but democracy fails in some cases because the voters’ views are irrational. Moreover, traditional public choice maintains that democracy fails because voters’ views are rational but ignored.

The only thing that I perceived in the common life is that everybody takes care of their private things, and it is odd to see bad administration in the private institutions (with rare exceptions). Moreover, corruption is more available and noticeable in public institutions, and not only at state firms, but in the legislation, when it is excessive and abusive. Developed countries have a free market between their states, but maintain protectionism in the key agricultural sector. It is not fair that the liberalization of the economy only serves for the goods and not for people. There is obviously the visible hand of the policy and lobbies, and the fear of a free competition.

This kind of double discourse of liberalization creates this bad taste of the free market and makes favor to the populist policy that uses the rhetoric of patriotism, sovereign and dignity, and opposes the developing countries to the rich countries.
__________________________
11. See Benegas (1998:12-13).
Nevertheless, this just creates a worse off environment in the economy of the less developed countries, and only benefits the lobbies of the state monopoly and the private oligopoly that protects their market with barriers and subsidies.

More didactic studies for common citizens, meaning the masses, are needed. Populism is just a step toward dictatorship and autarchy. Countries that are poor and discriminated with unfair policies have more tendencies towards this behavior. Finally, unilateral liberalization is needed inside the poor countries along with opening the economy towards a free-market, and eliminating or reducing the corruption to a minimal level.
July 9, 2006

 

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